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Abstract  
Various types of size-based regulations for firms are typical in most countries 
(tax schedules, accounting rules, health and safety standards etc.). However, 
there is only limited evidence of how owners of small firms respond to such 
rules, and what are the underlying mechanisms behind the observed behavior. 
We study these questions by examining the effects of the value-added tax (VAT) 
sales threshold using tax register data on the universe of Finnish firms and their 
owners. We find sizable bunching of firms in the sales distribution just below the 
VAT threshold. This implies that small firms actively avoid VAT liability. We 
utilize variation in both the VAT rate and reporting requirements to provide 
compelling evidence that the response is caused by the compliance costs of VAT 
reporting rather than the size of the tax rate. This shows that the costs related to 
reporting and understanding taxes induce greater distortions than pure tax 
incentives, especially among low-income entrepreneurs. In addition, we find no 
explicit evidence of avoidance or evasion, which suggests that firms respond by 
reducing their true output. Also, bunching behavior is very permanent, implying 
that the VAT threshold hinders the growth of small firms. 
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Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan arvonlisäveron (alv) alarajan vaikutuksia 
yritysten ja niiden omistajien käyttäytymiseen. Alv-alaraja luo yrityksille 
kannustimen välttää alv-velvollisuutta ja pysyä pienenä kasautumalla juuri 
liikevaihtorajan alapuolelle. Tämä kannustin syntyy kahdesta syystä: ensiksi, 
  
 
yritysten ei tarvitse maksaa veroja tehdystä arvonlisäyksestä liikevaihtorajan 
alapuolella, mutta rajan yläpuolella alv on tilitettävä. Toiseksi, hallinnolliset 
kustannukset kasvavat kun yritysten tulee rekisteröityä arvonlisäverovelvolliseksi 
sekä raportoida alv:n alaiset ostot ja myynnit Verohallinnolle.  
Tutkimustulosten perusteella alv-alaraja vääristää voimakkaasti yritysjakaumaa. 
Tuloksista havaitaan, että kaikentyyppiset pienet yritykset ja yrittäjät välttävät 
alv-velvollisuutta kasautumalla liikevaihtorajan alapuolelle. Kasautuminen juuri 
rajan alapuolelle on kuitenkin voimakkaampaa toiminimillä ja palvelutoimialoilla 
sekä sellaisten yritysten joukossa, joiden omistajat ovat pienituloisia. 
Tutkimuksessa havaitaan, että alv-raportointiin ja alv-järjestelmän 
yksityiskohtien ymmärtämiseen liittyvät hallinnolliset kustannukset selittävät 
yritysten kasautumista. Tulosten perusteella suuretkaan veromuutokset eivät 
muuttaneet yritysten kasautumisen määrää alarajalla. Esimerkiksi vuonna 2004 
käyttöön otettu alarajahuojennus ei vähentänyt rajan haitallisia vaikutuksia.  
Sitä vastoin alv-raportoimiseen liittyvien hallinnollisten vaatimusten 
keventämisellä oli positiivisia vaikutuksia yritysjakaumaan ja yritysten kasvuun. 
Vuonna 2010 pienet yritykset siirtyivät alv:n kuukausi-ilmoittamisesta vuosi-
ilmoittamiseen, ja samalla alv-huojennuksen hakemista helpotettiin. Nämä toimet 
vähensivät selvästi yritysten kasautumista juuri rajan alapuolelle. 
Tutkimus osoittaa, että alv-alarajalla on haitallisia vaikutuksia yritysten kasvuun. 
Tutkimuksen mukaan yritykset välttävät alv-alarajan ylittämästä useina 
peräkkäisinä vuosina. Tämä vaikutus on erityisen suuri sellaisilla yrityksillä, 
joiden omistajat ovat hyvin pienituloisia. Tutkimuksessa ei löydetä viitteitä siitä, 
että alv-alarajan aiheuttamat käyttäytymisvaikutukset johtuisivat veronkierrosta, 
verojen välttelystä tai yritysten pilkkomisesta. Tämä viittaa siihen, että yritykset 
reagoivat liikevaihtorajaan vähentämällä myyntiään.  
Tutkimuksen tulokset antavat tukea pieniin yrityksiin kohdistuvan hallinnollisen 
taakan keventämiselle. Tutkijat arvioivat, että yrittäjien alv-raportoinnin 
hallinnolliset kustannukset ovat keskimäärin noin 1,600 euroa. Tämä luku on 
huomattavasti suurempi kuin aiemmissa tutkimuksissa on arvioitu. Pienten 
yritysten hallinnollista taakkaa voidaan keventää esimerkiksi alv:n huojennuksen 
automaattisella myöntämisellä nykyisen hakemusmenettelyyn perustuvan 
järjestelmän sijaan. Lisäksi tutkijat katsovat, että nykyistä alv-alarajaa tulisi 
korottaa huomattavasti nykyisestä.    
 
Asiasanat: Arvonlisäverotus, hallinnolliset kulut, pienet yritykset, yrittäjät, 
bunching 
JEL-luokat: D22, H25, H32, L11  
1 Introdution
Various types of size-based regulations are ommonly applied to rms. These rules are apparent in, for
example, tax shedules, tax enforement and aounting regulations, and health and safety standards.
The main issue with these regulations is that they reate inentives for rms to stay small. Suh inentives
are generally undesirable, as they an signiantly distort the rm-size distribution (see e.g. Dharmapala
et al. (2011), Guner et al. (2008), and Gourio and Roys (2014)), and redue growth and produtivity
(see e.g. Besley and Burgess (2004), Best et al. (2015), Carroll et al. (2001), Hsieh and Klenow (2009),
and Gariano et al. (2013)). Despite their ommon ourrene, there is little empirial evidene of how
size-based rules aet the behavior of rms and their owners, and whih types of thresholds atually
hinder potential growth and ause the largest distortions. This knowledge is partiularly relevant for
small and young rms, who are found to ontribute signiantly to overall growth and produtivity
(Haltiwanger et al. (2016) and Crisuolo et al. (2014)).
To omprehensively understand the impliations of size-based rules, it is ruial to know whih
inentives aet the behavior of rms and their owners. For example, in many tax systems, tax liability
inreases and regulation tightens simultaneously at a given threshold, for example, above a ertain level
of turnover or taxable prots. Most previous studies fous on analyzing the tax rate elastiity, i.e. how
muh a relative hange in the tax rate aets the outome variable of interest (see e.g. Kleven and
Waseem (2013) and Devereux et al. (2014)). However, it ould be that ompliane osts (reporting
osts, understanding the tax rules et.) ause even more signiant behavioral responses than tax rates
(Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014)). Therefore, traditional tax elastiity estimates ould severely overstate
the importane of tax rates if the eet of ompliane osts is not taken into aount.
This paper exploits the value-added tax (VAT) threshold to investigate the eets of size-based
regulation on the behavior of small rms. In Finland, rms with less than 8,500 euros of annual sales
are not liable to report and pay VAT.
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Therefore, both tax inentives (remitted VAT) and ompliane
osts (frequent ling of VAT reports, understanding the VAT system et.) hange at this threshold in a
disontinuous manner, reating inentives for rms not to exeed the VAT threshold. We utilize reforms
in both the VAT rate at the threshold and VAT reporting requirements to examine whether the responses
are aused by tax inentives or ompliane osts. In addition, we study the impat of the threshold on
output growth of small rms and entrepreneurs.
We utilize high-quality tax register data on all Finnish rms and their main owners from 20002013.
We use the bunhing methodology introdued by Saez (2010), and further developed by Chetty et al.
(2011) and Kleven and Waseem (2013), to study whether the disontinuous hange in inentives indues
1
VAT is a broadly based tax assessed on the value added to goods and servies. VAT is a ommonly applied form of
onsumption taxation in many ountries. Most VAT systems inlude varying thresholds below whih rms are exempt
from remitting and reporting VAT. For example, in the EU ountries, the VAT thresholds vary between 0-100,000 euros.
Half of the EU ountries apply thresholds below 25,000 euros, inluding e.g. Germany, Belgium and Denmark.
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small rms not to exeed the VAT threshold. In short, the bunhing method utilizes the exess mass
in the sales distribution at the threshold to infer the extent of the intensive margin behavioral response
aused by it. A partiular advantage of the bunhing approah is that we obtain visually lear and
onvining results on the eets of the threshold.
The VAT threshold in Finland is very low, and thus it mainly aets very small rms and low-inome
entrepreneurs. However, it is interesting to learn how a size-based threshold aets eonomi ativity
among small rms, and whih types of inentives are the most important for these edgling businesses. In
the data, 90% of the rms in the neighborhood of the threshold are single-owned entities, whih implies
that rm-level deisions typially reet the hoies and preferenes of a single entrepreneur. In addition,
approximately 35% of these small rms operate in the servie setor, but the overall heterogeneity in the
industry lassiation is onsiderable. Over 50% of the owners of small rms have low personal taxable
inome (apital + earned inome < 10,000 euros), whih implies that the rm is an important soure of
disposable inome for many low-inome entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, approximately 20% of owners have
relevant personal inome soures outside the rm (> 30,000 euros), indiating that the rm onstitutes
a seondary soure of inome for many individuals.
Our rst result is that we observe that the VAT threshold auses a large and signiant overall
behavioral response. We nd lear and sizable bunhing of rms in the sales distribution just below
the threshold. This shows that small rms atively avoid VAT liability. Our results indiate that all
types of owners and rms respond signiantly. However, the behavioral eets are more pronouned
among low-inome entrepreneurs and sole proprietors, whih suggests that the distortions aused by the
threshold are largest in these groups.
We utilize various soures of variation in tax inentives and ompliane osts to provide ompelling
evidene of the fators that ause small rms to avoid VAT liability. First, we examine the impat of
the tax rate by utilizing hanges in the VAT rate at the threshold. Before 2004, the average VAT rate
inreased sharply if a rm exeeded the threshold. Firms above the threshold were liable to pay full
VAT on all sales, inluding sales below the threshold. In 2004, Finland introdued a VAT relief sheme
in whih the average tax rate inreases only gradually above the threshold. For an example rm with
sales of 10,000 euros and no tax-dedutible expenses, the remitted VAT dereased from 2,200 euros to
250 euros after the reform, implying that the VAT relief system indued a drasti redution in remitted
VAT in the neighborhood of the threshold. In addition, Finland experimented with targeted VAT rate
redutions for ertain spei types of servies. Consequently, the VAT rate for hairdressers was redued
from 22% to 8% in 20072011. At the same time, the VAT rate for similar servies suh as beauty salons
remained unhanged.
In addition, VAT reporting requirements hanged in 2010 in two ways. First, before 2010, rms
needed to le a separate tax form in order to reeive the VAT relief. After 2010, the VAT relief an be
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applied by simply tiking a box in the regular VAT form. Seond, small rms with annual sales below
25,000 euros are required to le a VAT report annually, in ontrast to monthly VAT reporting before
2010. Both of these hanges arguably redued the ompliane osts of VAT reporting among small rms.
By using this variation, we an study the role of ompliane osts in explaining the observed behavior of
rms. To our knowledge, this is the rst paper that distinguishes between the ompliane ost and tax
inentive responses of small rms utilizing quasi-experimental variation.
Surprisingly, we nd that even onsiderable redutions in the VAT rate do not aet the extent of
the bunhing response. We do not nd any hanges in the observed behavior after the drasti drop in
the VAT rate at the threshold in 2004, nor between similar industries that faed dierent hanges in
VAT rates over time (hairdressers vs. beauty salons).
2
In ontrast, the exess mass dereased sharply
when ompliane osts were redued in 2010. In addition, we observe a sharp jump in voluntary VAT
registration and the take-up rate of the VAT relief exatly in 2010, highlighting the importane of
ompliane osts.
Our results strongly indiate that ompliane osts are the key fator in explaining the observed
behavior. This implies that dereasing ompliane osts by, for example, simplifying or reduing reporting
proedures an alleviate the distortions aused by size-based regulation among small rms. Furthermore,
the results highlight that interpreting the behavioral response as being aused solely by the VAT rate
would largely overestimate the signiane of tax inentives. If we interpret the entire response as
stemming from tax inentives, we nd that the implied loal tax rate elastiity jumped disretely from
0.2 to 0.9 in 2004 when the VAT rate at the threshold was signiantly redued but no hanges in
bunhing behavior was observed. It is implausible that suh a sudden hike would have ourred in the
underlying average tax elastiity of entrepreneurs.
Size-based thresholds typially reate inentives for rms to stay small, whih ould indue negative
growth eets and ause signiant long-run eieny losses (see e.g. Guner et al. (2008), and Gourio
and Roys (2014)). In the Finnish ontext, the VAT threshold ould hinder the growth of small businesses
if rms avoid exeeding the threshold for a prolonged period of time. The panel struture of the data
allows us to follow rms over time, and thus examine the eets of the threshold on growth. In addition,
we ompare small Finnish rms in labor-intensive industries to similar rms in Sweden. There is no VAT
threshold in Sweden, and thus Swedish rms represent an intuitive benhmark for analyzing the growth
eets of the Finnish threshold. Furthermore, despite the dierent VAT threshold poliy, Finland and
Sweden are very similar in terms of the VAT system (e.g. tax rates and VAT reporting praties), the
business tax struture and the overall institutional and ultural framework.
Our results show that bunhing behavior is very permanent, as a signiant share of rms avoid
exeeding the threshold for many onseutive years. Our evidene indiates that this negative growth
2
Kosonen (2015) uses beauty salons as a omparison group to study prie pass-through and demand responses of the
VAT rate ut for hairdressers in Finland.
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eet is foused on low-inome entrepreneurs rather than part-time owners with signiant inome outside
the rm. Moreover, a omparison of Finnish and Swedish rms in labor-intensive industries supports
the overall onlusion that the VAT threshold has notable eets on growth. In 20052013, the average
annual growth rate of Finnish rms just below the threshold was zero, while omparable Swedish rms
inreased their annual sales by 1015%. In ontrast, the dierene in growth rates is insigniant at
larger levels of sales, highlighting the detrimental eets of the threshold. In addition, we nd that the
exit rates of rms inrease above the threshold in Finland, whih suggests that the threshold also aets
the extensive margin deisions of entrepreneurs.
We also examine whether the behavioral responses are driven by tax avoidane, tax evasion or the
real output margin. Our indiative evidene suggest no systemati tax avoidane in terms of owners
splitting larger rms into smaller entities. In addition, we nd no lear support for underreporting of
sales whih implies that tax evasion responses are not explaining the results. Therefore, we interpret
that rms respond via hanges in real output and eonomi ativity. Combined with the evidene of
negative growth eets, this suggests that the eieny eets of the VAT threshold an be notable (see
e.g. Slemrod (1992) for a disussion of the welfare eets of dierent types of responses).
This paper ontributes to several branhes of literature. First, our results add to the sare empirial
literature examining the eets of dierent size-based rules and regulations on rm behavior. Best et
al. (2015) observe that rms bunh sharply at the kink point that separates the turnover and prot tax
regimes in Pakistan. They utilize variation in inentives over time and aross rms to show that the
observed behavior is mainly driven by tax evasion. Gourio and Roys (2014) and Gariano et al. (2013)
examine the eets of an employee threshold (50 pers.) in Frane above whih many types of osts and
regulations are inreased and tightened (e.g. the payroll tax rate and ring osts). Both of these papers
nd that this threshold learly aets the rm-size distribution and the produtivity of rms. Almunia
and Lopez-Rodriguez (2016) study the responses to a tax enforement threshold using Spanish rm data.
They nd that rms avoid exeeding the striter enforement by bunhing just below the threshold, and
observe that the eet is driven by evasion responses.
Despite the general appliation of VAT thresholds, only a few previous papers study the eets of
these thresholds. The theoretial literature has haraterized the rules for an optimal VAT threshold.
Keen and Mintz (2004) and Kanbur and Keen (2014) show that the optimal VAT threshold depends
on administrative and ompliane osts, and the extent to whih rms respond to the threshold.
3
The
existing empirial literature has foused on VAT thresholds in relation to larger rms. Onji (2009) was
the rst to detet lear eets of a VAT threshold (approx. 3,3 million US dollars) on the distribution
of rms in Japan. He shows that large Japanese rms reated to the introdution of a VAT threshold
by splitting into smaller entities, reeting lear tax avoidane behavior. Li and Lokwood (2015) show
3
Also, Zee (2005) oers a formula for setting the optimal VAT threshold.
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that rms in the UK bunh atively at the relatively large VAT threshold (100,000 euros). Also, Waseem
(2015) observes a lustering of rms at the VAT threshold in Pakistan (42,000 euros), and Boonzaaier et
al. (2016) in South Afria (63,000 euros). In ontrast, Asatryan and Peihl (2016) nd no responses to
the VAT threshold in Armenia (150,000 euros), but nd that rms respond to other regulative thresholds.
We ontribute to this literature by arefully examining the mehanisms behind the observed responses
to the VAT threshold, and by analyzing the eets of the threshold among small rms.
Furthermore, our paper adds to the literature on the osts related to reporting taxes and under-
standing the tax ode. For example, Chetty et al. (2009) show that the saliene of sales tax rates is
an important element in explaining behavioral responses among onsumers. Benzarti (2016) studies the
amount of hassle osts related to tax ling using register data on US inome tax returns. He nds that
these osts, approximately 650 US dollars on average, are muh larger than previous estimates suggest.
We ontribute to this literature by showing that ompliane osts are also highly relevant for small rms
and entrepreneurs. Utilizing the bunhing approah, we estimate that the annual ompliane ost of
VAT reporting for small rms is approximately 1,600 euros.
Finally, we ontribute to the literature applying the bunhing method to analyze the behavioral
responses to inome tax rate disontinuities among entrepreneurs. For example, Devereux et al. (2014)
nd that small orporations in the UK respond sharply to a jump in the orporate inome tax rate.
Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011) and Bastani and Selin (2014) nd that entrepreneurs in partiular
tend to respond atively to disontinuous jumps in their personal marginal inome tax rates in the
US, Denmark and Sweden, respetively. Supporting these results, the vast literature on taxable inome
responses to marginal inome tax rates shows that entrepreneurs are partiularly responsive, but the
responses an be typially explained by tax avoidane behavior (see a survey by Saez et al. (2012), and
Harju and Matikka (2016) for evidene for Finland). In ontrast to this literature, we nd no evidene
of avoidane or underreporting, whih implies that small rms respond by adjusting their true output.
This is also onsistent with the notion that low-inome entrepreneurs and sole proprietors have more
limited opportunities for avoidane, ompared to high-inome owners of orporations.
This paper proeeds as follows: Setion 2 desribes the VAT threshold in Finland, and the oneptual
bunhing methodology and estimation strategy. Setion 3 desribes the data. Setion 4 presents the
results, and Setion 5 onludes the study.
2 Institutions and methodology
2.1 Value-added taxation
Most developed ountries use value-added tax (VAT) as their primary onsumption tax system. VAT
is usually a broadly based tax assessed on the value added to goods and servies. The amount of value
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added is alulated by subtrating the amount of externally purhased goods and servies from the value
of goods and servies sold.
In short, the VAT assessment proess is the following: eah trader in the hain of supply (from
manufaturers to retailers) harges VAT on their sales. Individual rms are entitled to dedut the VAT
paid on purhases from this amount. VAT is remitted to the tax authorities by the seller of the goods
and servies.
VAT is an important soure of tax revenue in many ountries. In Finland, VAT aounts for ap-
proximately one third of all tax revenue. Among OECD ountries, almost one fth of all tax revenue is
olleted from VAT. However, the variation in VAT revenue is large aross ountries.
Finland, as a member of the European Union (EU), applies the general EU VAT legislation (European
Commission (2006a)). All members of the EU apply a standard VAT rate of at least 15%. The EU allows
member ountries to use a maximum of two redued VAT rates for spei produts and servies, suh
as food and pharmaeutials.
The standard VAT rate in Finland is 24% in 2016. The standard rate applies to most goods and
servies. Finland uses two redued VAT rates: a 14% rate is applied to e.g. food and restaurant servies,
and 10% is applied to e.g. books and pharmaeutials.
4
Some goods and servies are exempt from VAT. These inlude nanial and insurane ativities,
letting and operation of dwellings, eduation, health servies and soial work ativities. Firms that sell
solely these goods or servies are not liable to pay VAT in Finland.
Moreover, EU legislation allows member states to apply redued VAT rates to ertain labor-intensive
industries (European Commission (2006b)). Finland experimented with a speial redued VAT rate for
hairdresser servies. In 20072011, the VAT rate for hairdressers was redued from 22% to 8%.
5
However,
other similar servies, suh as those oered in beauty salons, were not part of the experiment and thus
not subjet to the redued VAT rate.
2.2 VAT threshold
In many VAT systems, rms with annual sales below a ertain predetermined threshold are not required
to remit VAT and report sales and purhases subjet to VAT to the tax authority. Figure 1 shows
these annual sales thresholds in the OECD ountries in 2014. The gure highlights that the thresholds
vary onsiderably aross ountries. While some ountries levy VAT on all sales without a speied VAT
threshold (e.g. Sweden and Turkey), some ountries apply relatively high thresholds around 100,000
euros (e.g. Switzerland and the UK). A notable share of ountries apply a relatively low inome threshold
between 0-20,000 euros of annual sales, inluding e.g. Germany and Canada.
4
Until 2010, the standard VAT rate was 22% in Finland. The standard VAT rate was inreased to 23% in 2010, and to
24% in 2013. The rst redued rate was 17% until 2009. It was dereased to 12% in 2009, and inreased to 13% in 2010
and to 14% in 2013. The seond redued rate was 8% until 2010, and was inreased to 9% in 2010 and to 10% in 2013.
5
Kosonen (2015) studies the inidene and eieny impliations of this reform.
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Figure 1: Annual sales thresholds of VAT registration in OECD ountries in 2014 (in euros)
In Finland, the VAT liability threshold for rms was 8,500 euros of annual sales in 20002015. Note
that on January 1st 2002, Finland replaed the Finnish mark with the euro as its oial urreny.
Before 2002, the threshold was 50,000 Finnish marks, whih is equivalent to 8,500 euros.
6
Therefore, the
threshold has remained onstant from 1995 in nominal terms, although it was inreased to 10,000 euros
in 2016.
Even though small rms below the threshold are exempt from VAT, they need to report their overall
sales to the Tax Administration for inome tax purposes. Therefore, we have data on the annual sales
of rms below the threshold, as this information is required for inome tax purposes. Furthermore, the
VAT threshold is not onneted to other regulative rules, suh as employer soial seurity ontribution
rates or the right to laim individual-level unemployment benets.
Tax inentives at the threshold. Next, we desribe the main details related to the VAT threshold in
Finland. We fous on reent poliy hanges that aeted both the size of tax inentives and ompliane
osts. We utilize this variation in our main analysis when studying the mehanisms behind observed rm
behavior.
We begin by desribing the disontinuous hange in tax inentives at the threshold. Before 2004,
rms that exeeded the threshold paid VAT on all value added. This inluded value added on sales
below the threshold. Therefore, exeeding the VAT threshold reated a notable jump in VAT liability
6
The oial onversion rate was dened suh that 1 euro is equivalent to 5.94573 marks. The euro was in-
trodued as an aount urreny already in 1999, but euro banknotes and oins were irulated from the begin-
ning of 2002. Therefore, the three years (19992002) were a transition period preparing for the euro (see e.g.
http://e.europa.eu/eonomy_nane/euro/ountries/nland_en.htm).
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and the average VAT rate.
In 2004, Finland hanged its VAT system by introduing a VAT relief sheme. The VAT relief redues
remitted VAT suh that the average VAT rate inreases only gradually above the threshold, ompared
to a sharp disontinuous jump in the average VAT rate before. The VAT relief sheme was applied to
rms with annual sales below 20,000 euros in 2004, and the relief was extended to rms with sales below
22,500 in 2005. This limit remained unhanged until 2016 when the upper limit of the relief region was
extended to 30,000.
Figure 2 shows VAT remittanes in euros and average VAT rates for dierent levels of sales (in bins
of 100 euros). The gure illustrates the introdution of the VAT relief region in 2004 and the post-2005
shedule in omparison to the pre-2004 period for a representative rm that is subjet to the standard
VAT rate. For illustrative purposes, the representative rm is assumed to have no dedutible VAT on
purhases, implying that the value added equals the sales of the rm.
The gure shows that the pre-reform system reated a salient VAT noth, induing a lear jump in
remitted VAT and the average VAT rate from 0 to 22% at the threshold (the standard VAT rate in
Finland was 22% until July 1st 2010). After the reform, the noth was replaed by a VAT kink, implying
gradually inreasing remitted VAT and average VAT rate above the threshold. Within the VAT relief
sheme, the gradually inreasing average VAT rate implies an inreasing marginal VAT rate above the
threshold up to the point at whih the average VAT rate equals 22%. This leads to gradually inreasing
marginal VAT rates between 1357% above the threshold within the relief region.
Figure 2 highlights the striking dierene in tax inentives between the two VAT regimes. Consider
a rm with annual sales equal to 10,000 euros, whih thus exeeds the VAT threshold by 1,500 euros.
Before 2004, the average VAT rate on all value added for this rm was 22%. After 2004, the average
VAT rate is around 2.5%, whih is over eight times less than before the reform. Thus, in terms of pure
tax inentives, the reform indued a distintive hange at the threshold. However, as an be seen from
the gure, the dierene between the regimes dereases at larger sales levels, and disappears above the
relief region.
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Figure 2: VAT remittane and average VAT rates for dierent levels of sales before and after the intro-
dution of the VAT relief system
Compliane osts. In addition to remitted VAT, a rm faes other osts when exeeding the threshold.
We refer to these as ompliane osts. These inlude reporting and aounting osts related to VAT
reporting. In addition, ompliane osts ontain ognitive osts of understanding the VAT system and
applying the rules of VAT legislation.
In more detail, one a rm beomes liable to pay VAT, it needs to le separate periodi reports on
sales and purhases subjet to VAT to the Tax Administration. This proedure an be exeuted by
the owner, or she an purhase an aounting servie to ondut the VAT reporting for the rm. The
reporting obligation overs sales at dierent VAT rates, input purhases, zero-rated sales, and imports
and exports. Also, the rm is legally required to separate the share of VAT from the selling prie in all
reeipts and invoies, whih inreases ompliane osts.
In addition, omplex reporting proedures and detailed VAT rules an be diult to learn and
omprehend. Thus exeeding the threshold is likely to indue ognitive osts for the owners of small
rms.
The ompliane osts of VAT reporting hanged in 2010. First, before 2010, rms needed to apply
for VAT relief using a separate tax form in order to be eligible for redued VAT payments above the
threshold (the VAT relief system is desribed above). From 2010 onward, rms an apply for VAT relief
by simply tiking a box in the same periodi tax form they use to delare remitted VAT. This simplied
proedure redued the mehanial burden of lling out tax forms, and likely made the urrent VAT
system more transparent.
10
Seond, the frequeny of the required VAT reports was hanged. Before 2010, all rms needed to
omplete a VAT report on a monthly basis.
7
After 2010, rms with annual sales below 25,000 euros
are required to report their VAT annually. This reform thus dereased the reporting osts of VAT. In
addition to small rms lose to the VAT threshold, rms with annual sales between 25,00050,000 euros
are required to le a VAT report quarterly, in ontrast to monthly reporting before 2010.
Overall, both of these reforms redued the ompliane osts related to VAT registration for small
rms. We utilize this variation to study whether redued ompliane osts aet the behavior of small
rms lose to the threshold.
Voluntary registration. Firms that do not exeed the VAT threshold an voluntarily register and
pay VAT. There are logial reasons for registering even when it is not neessary. First, a rm an only
dedut the VAT from its purhases if it is registered, and thus voluntary registration ould be important
for businesses that have, for example, large start-up osts. Seond, rms below the threshold that have
a large share of business-to-business sales have an inreased inentive to register, as the VAT rebate is
only granted for purhases from VAT registered rms. Thus some VAT registered rms might prefer
other VAT registered rms in business-to-business transations. Third, VAT registration an enhane
the status of the rm and give the appearane that the rm is a large and trustworthy partner. This
an be appealing for both ustomers and suppliers, and therefore inrease business ativity.
In ontrast to non-registered rms, the VAT threshold indues smaller or no loal hanges in inentives
for voluntarily registered rms. First, ompliane osts do not jump at the threshold for voluntarily
registered rms as they are already reporting VAT. Before 2004, there were also no hanges in the VAT
rate at the threshold, implying no inentives to remain below the threshold, onditional on voluntary
registration. In omparison, VAT relief also applies to voluntary registered rms below the threshold
after 2004. This implies a jump in the marginal VAT rate at the threshold for voluntarily registered rms,
but no disontinuous hanges in ompliane osts. In our analysis, we utilize this variation for voluntarily
registered rms to provide additional evidene of the sole eet of tax inentives at the threshold.
2.3 Bunhing at the VAT threshold
A rapidly growing literature utilizes bunhing around points that reate disontinuous hanges in inen-
tives to study the extent of behavioral responses and to reover strutural parameters suh as tax rate
elastiities. The bunhing approah, rst introdued by Saez (2010), has been used in a wide range of
appliations, suh as inome taxes, soial transfers and priing poliies, to oer evidene of intensive
margin responses.
8
The bunhing methodology and reent literature is surveyed by Kleven (2015).
7
However, there were some minor exeptions to this rule. For example, for performing artists it was possible to delare
VAT on a yearly basis.
8
In the end of Setion 4.4, we also disuss the potential impliations of the VAT threshold on extensive margin responses
by examining the exit and entry rates of rms over the sales distribution.
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Intuitively, if a disontinuous hange in VAT liability at the threshold aets the behavior of rms, we
should nd an exess mass of rms loated just below the threshold in the sales distribution. As disussed
above, exeeding the VAT threshold indues a disontinuous inrease in both tax liability (remitted VAT)
and ompliane osts related to VAT reporting. Therefore, the threshold reates a noth in rms' hoie
set.
Figure 3 illustrates the eets of the VAT threshold on the behavior of rms with smooth and
heterogeneous preferenes over gross sales (eort of the owner/rm) and after-tax sales (prot before
osts). For oneptual simpliity, we denote that rms respond to the threshold. However, a majority of
small rms around the threshold are owned and managed by a single owner (almost 90% in our baseline
sample). Thus we assume that the owner makes all the relevant rm-level deisions, and the eort of
the owner largely ontributes to the output of the rm.
First, we ignore ompliane osts and disuss the inentives reated solely by the hange in the VAT
rate. Panel I of Figure 3 desribes the budget set in the VAT noth system (pre-2004 system in Finland),
whih indued a lear disontinuous jump in remitted VAT at the threshold. The simplied tax funtion
exluding other taxes than VAT is TN (s) = [τN (s− zs)] · 1(s > s
∗), where s∗ is the VAT threshold and
τN is the VAT rate. zs denotes the linear funtion of tax-dedutible purhases z needed to generate s,
where 0 ≤ z < 1. In the gure, the VAT remitted below s∗ is denoted by △T (s∗).
In the absene of the VAT threshold, rms loate themselves along the 45-degree budget line based
on the preferenes of their owners. When introduing the VAT noth, rms below or diretly at the
threshold (Type A rm in the gure) do not hange their behavior. Type B rm represents a marginal
bunhing rm with sales s∗ +△sN before the introdution of the threshold that is preisely indierent
between loating at s∗ or sB. A fration of rms with sales between s∗ and s∗ +△sN will move below
the threshold, whih reates an exess mass of rms at s∗ in the sales distribution.
Panel II displays bunhing at the VAT kink system where tax liability inreases gradually above the
threshold (post-2003 system in Finland). The tax funtion is TK(s) = [(s− s
∗)− (zs− zs∗)] τk, whih
implies that the rm pays VAT only on the value added exeeding s∗. Similarly as above, a fration of
rms loated between s∗and s∗+△sK will bunh around the threshold. The prinipal dierene between
the noth and kink regimes is that the former reates notably larger tax inentives not to exeed the
threshold.
Panel III of Figure 3 introdues ompliane osts to the VAT kink shedule. The extended tax funtion
inluding ompliane osts is TC(s) = [(s− s
∗)− (zs− zs∗)] τk + δ(s
∗) · 1(s > s∗), where δ(s∗) denotes
the xed ompliane ost of VAT reporting. The assumption of xed ompliane osts is feasible, sine
presumably the osts related to lling out VAT forms or understanding the VAT rules do not inrease
or derease with sales lose to s∗. We assume that the xed ompliane ost diers between dierent
owners, thus leading to a distribution of xed ost aross rms.
12
Overall, the introdution of xed ompliane osts reates an additional noth to the budget set,
reating larger inentives to avoid exeeding the threshold. The eet of ompliane osts is similar in
the VAT noth shedule, where ompliane osts inrease the size of the noth in the budget set.
As disussed above, it is reasonable for some rms to register voluntarily for VAT. These rms have
no inentives to bunh at the threshold in the noth shedule. In the kink shedule, only tax inentives
hange at the threshold for voluntarily registered rms. Consequently, as there are rms with no or only
small inentives not to exeed the threshold, we are likely to observe a positive mass of rms also just
above the VAT threshold in the sales distribution. In other words, the VAT threshold does not indue a
region of dominated hoie just above the threshold where no rms with standard preferenes will loate,
in omparison to an inome tax noth often disussed in the bunhing literature (Kleven 2015, Kleven
and Waseem 2013).
Following this, Panel IV illustrates the theoretial sales distribution in the presene of the VAT
threshold. The solid blue line denotes the observed sales distribution after the introdution of the VAT
threshold. The red dashed line denotes the ounterfatual distribution that would exist in the absene
of the threshold. A fration of rms originally loated between s∗ and s∗+△s move below the threshold
beause of tax inentives and/or ompliane osts. This behavior reates a spike in the distribution at
s∗, and a missing mass in the distribution above it. Assuming heterogeneous preferenes aross dierent
rms and no extensive margin responses, the observed density gradually approahes the ounterfatual
density above s∗ (see Kleven (2015)).
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Figure 3: Bunhing at the VAT rate noth (Panel I) ii), VAT rate kink (Panel II), VAT rate kink with
ompliane osts (Panel III), and the theoretial sales distribution in the presene of bunhing (Panel
IV)
2.4 Determinants of bunhing behavior
The behavioral response aused by the VAT threshold is estimated by relating the observed exess mass
below the threshold to the ounterfatual density. This bunhing estimate inludes responses to both tax
inentives, i.e. the sales elastiity with respet to the VAT rate, and ompliane osts. Therefore, the
ross setional bunhing estimate is a funtion of two unobserved omponents: bˆ = b(τ, s∗; e, δ), where
e is the underlying VAT rate elastiity and δ denotes the responsiveness to ompliane osts. The sales
elastiity with respet to the VAT rate is expressed as e = (△s∗/s∗)/(△τ/τ), where the sales response
(△s∗/s∗) is related to the hange in the VAT rate at the threshold (△τ/τ). We disuss the pratial
estimation of the exess mass and the elastiity parameter in detail in Setion 2.5.
In our main analysis, we follow the approah in Best et al. (2015) and Gelber et al. (2015)
9
and
utilize variation in inentives over time to distinguish between dierent unobserved fators that aet
the extent of the bunhing behavior. We utilize quasi-experimental variation in both tax inentives and
9
Best et al. (2015) utilize hanges in the loation of the turnover/prot tax threshold over time to infer whether the
observed response is aused by evasion or real responses. Gelber et al. (2015) utilize hanges in the size of the kink reated
by the Soial Seurity Annual Earnings Test (AET) in the US to distinguish between individual adjustment fritions and
the strutural earnings elastiity.
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ompliane osts to study whether the observed response to the threshold is aused by the VAT rate or
ompliane osts, or both. To do this, we estimate the amount of bunhing at the threshold in dierent
tax inentive and ompliane ost regimes over time.
In the following, we assume that both tax inentives and ompliane osts hange at the thresh-
old simultaneously. In the ase of the VAT noth (20002003), the amount of bunhing is given by
bN (τN , s
∗; e, δ) =
´ s∗+△sN
s∗
h0(s)ds ⋍ h0(s
∗)△s∗, where h0(s
∗) is the estimated ounterfatual density,
and s∗ +△sN denotes the marginal bunhing rm. Similarly, in the VAT kink system (20042009), the
amount of bunhing is dened as bK(τK , s
∗; e, δ) =
´ s∗+△sK
s∗
h0(s)ds. After the ompliane ost reform
(20102013), the exess bunhing is bC(τK , s
∗; e, δC) =
´ s∗+△sC
s∗
h0(s)ds, where δC < δ.
If we assume that tax inentives drive rms to avoid exeeding the threshold, we should observe that
bˆN (τN , s
∗; e, δ) > bˆK(τK , s
∗; e, δ). In other words, there would always be more bunhing in the noth
shedule ompared to the kink regime if the VAT rate drives the response. This hypothesis follows from
assuming that the underlying tax rate elastiity remains onstant over time (or at least that e does
not jump in a disontinuous fashion at the time of the reform), and that the owners have smooth and
heterogeneous preferenes over gross sales and after-tax sales. Assuming bN > bK is feasible as long as
the marginal bunher rm is loated within the VAT relief region (below 22,500 euros) in the absene of
the threshold. In this ase, TK(s
∗ +△sN ) < TN (s
∗ +△sN ) by denition, beause the remitted VAT is
smaller for the marginal bunher at a given point in the sales distribution above s∗ (see Figure 2 above).
Moreover, if we assume that ompliane osts aet rm responses, we should observe that bˆK(τN , s
∗; e, δ) >
bˆC(τK , s
∗; e, δC). This assumption follows from the fat that the ompliane ost is smaller after the 2010
reform (δC < δ), and thus the overall inentives to avoid the VAT liability are smaller.
Our testable hypotheses are therefore the following: if tax inentives fully drive the response, we
should observe that the exess mass at the threshold dereases after the VAT relief reform by the full
amount implied by the VAT rate elastiity. If the hange in exess mass is smaller than that but still
signiant, we an dedue that both tax inentives and ompliane osts explain the observed responses.
If tax inentives indue no responses, we should nd that bˆN ≈ bˆK . This would indiate that ompliane
osts dominate in explaining the observed responses. For this equality to hold, the following ondition
needs to hold: δ(s∗) ≥ (1− z)(s∗ +△sN )− TK(s
∗ +△sN ). This implies that in order for the marginal
bunher rm not to reloate from below the threshold to (s∗ +△sN) after the VAT rate redution, the
ompliane osts must be equal to or greater than the net value added at (s∗ +△sN ).10
In addition, if dereased ompliane osts redue the observed exess mass, we should nd that
bˆK > bˆC . If ompliane osts indue no hanges, we should observe similar responses before and after
the hange in ompliane osts. Overall, mutually onsistent results from both the hanges in tax
10
Similar hypotheses are also appliable when analyzing dierent hanges in the VAT rate aross similar industries, i.e.
when omparing the exess mass estimates of hairdressers that experiened a VAT rate redution with beauty salons that
did not fae hanges in the VAT rate.
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inentives and ompliane osts over time would give us straightforward and onvining evidene on the
determinants on the observed response.
2.5 Empirial estimation
Following earlier bunhing literature (e.g. Chetty et al. (2011)), the ounterfatual density is estimated
by tting a exible polynomial funtion to the observed distribution, exluding an area around s∗ from
the observed distribution. First, we re-enter inome in terms of s∗, and group rms into small sales bins
of 100¿. We then estimate a ounterfatual density by regressing the following equation and exluding
the region around the threshold [sL, sH ] from the regression
cj =
p∑
i=0
βi(sj)
i +
sH∑
i=sL
ηi · 1(sj = i) + εj (1)
where cj is the ount of rms in bin j, and sj denotes the sales level in bin j. The order of the polynomial
is denoted by p. Thus the tted values for the ounterfatual density are given by cˆj =
∑p
i=0 βi(sj)
i.
The exess bunhing is estimated by relating the atual number of rms lose to the threshold within
(sL, s
∗) to the estimated ounterfatual density in the same region:
bˆ(s∗) =
∑s∗
i=sL
(cj − cˆj)
∑s∗
i=sL
cˆj/Nj
(2)
where Nj is the number of bins within [sL, s
∗].
As in the earlier literature, we determine the lower limit of the exluded region (sL) based on visual
observations of the sales distribution. Intuitively, sL represents the point in the sales distribution where
the bunhing behavior begins, i.e. the density of rms begins to inrease. Due to imperfet ontrol and
unertainty about the exat amount of annual sales, it is likely that we do not observe sharp bunhing
exatly at the threshold but rather a luster of rms in a region below it.
We follow the approah of Kleven and Waseem (2013) to dene the upper limit. We determine sH
suh that the estimated exess mass bˆE(s
∗) = (
∑s∗
i=sL
cj − cˆj) equals the estimated missing mass above
the threshold, bˆM (s
∗) = (
∑sH
s>s∗ cˆj − cj). We apply this onvergene ondition by starting from a small
value of sH and inreasing it gradually until bˆE(s
∗) ≈ bˆM (s
∗). This denition for sH denotes the upper
bound of the exluded range, and thus the lower bound for estimated exess bunhing (Kleven and
Waseem 2013).
11
This ondition states that rms that bunh at the threshold ome from the region
diretly above it, as shown in Panel IV of Figure 3 above. Furthermore, this onvergene ondition
11
Kleven and Waseem (2013) apply this onvergene ondition to estimate the ounterfatual density around individual
inome tax nothes in Pakistan. For individual tax rate kink points in Denmark, Chetty et al. (2011) determine the upper
limit visually, and then iteratively adjust the ounterfatual density above the kink point suh that it inludes the exess
mass at the kink. This makes the estimated ounterfatual density equal to the observed density. These proedures are
intuitively similar, but the onvergene method of Kleven and Waseem (2013) typially provides a smaller estimate for
exess bunhing. In addition, the onvergene method provides a more justied approah to dene the upper limit of the
exluded region when estimating the ounterfatual density.
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denes the marginal bunher rm with sales s∗ +△s.
In addition, we relate the estimated exess bunhing to the hange in the VAT rate at the threshold to
alulate the tax rate elastiity. Following Kleven and Waseem (2013), we relate the sales response of the
estimated marginal bunher rm to the hange in the remitted VAT aused by exeeding the threshold
by △s. We alulate the elastiity at the VAT noth using the following quadrati formula: eN ≈
(△s/s∗)2/△tN , where △s/s
∗ = (sH − s
∗)/s∗ is the relative sales response of the marginal bunher, and
△tN = [(s
∗ − zs∗) + ((△s− s∗)− (z△s− zs∗))] τn/△s denes the relative inrease in VAT payments
aused by exeeding the threshold by ∆s. In the VAT kink regime, the elastiity is eK ≈ (△s/s
∗)2/△tK ,
where △tK = ((△s− s
∗)− (z△s− zs∗))τk/△s.
Compared to the VAT noth, the rm needs to pay VAT only for sales above s∗ within the VAT
kink system. This implies that the impliit marginal tax rate (△tN , △tK) is larger at the VAT noth
ompared to the VAT kink with a given sales response △s. However, as Figure 2 above shows, the
average VAT rate inreases above the VAT kink, implying a smoothly inreasing marginal VAT rate.
Therefore, τk is not onstant in pratie, as it inreases with △s in the VAT relief sheme. We take this
issue into aount when alulating the implied elastiity. In addition, we use the bin-level average of
the value added of the marginal bunher rm when alulating the impliit VAT rate and the elastiity
estimates.
As is ustomary in the literature, we alulate standard errors for all the estimates using a residual-
based bootstrap proedure. We generate a large number of sales distributions by randomly resampling
the residuals from equation (1) with replaements, and generate a large number of new estimates of the
ounterfatual density based on the resampled distributions. The bootstrap proedure takes into aount
the iterative proess to determine sH . Based on the bootstrapped ounterfatual densities, we evaluate
variation in the estimates of interest. The standard errors for eah estimate are dened as the standard
deviation in the distribution of the estimate.
3 Data and desriptive statistis
3.1 Data
Our data are from the Finnish Tax Administration and over the period 20002013. The data ontain
all businesses that operate in Finland, inluding rms that are registered to pay VAT and rms that are
not inluded in the VAT register. The data also inlude aurate information on total sales for rms
that are below the VAT threshold, as this information is required for inome tax purposes. Thus this
data enable us to analyze the eet of the VAT threshold on the distribution of sales.
The data inlude all information needed for tax purposes, suh as sales, taxable prots, expenses,
assets and the organizational form. In addition, we have data on other relevant rm-level variables,
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inluding the number of employees and the industry lassiation. Also, we an link owner-level variables,
suh as the personal taxable wage and apital inome of the main owner, to the rm-level data. The
owner-level data are available from 2002 onward.
In the following analysis, we exlude all rms that operate in setors that are not subjet to VAT,
suh as nanial and insurane ativities, letting and operation of dwellings, eduation, and health and
soial work ativities. Sine these rms are not liable to pay VAT, it is not relevant to inlude them
in the analysis of behavioral responses to the VAT threshold. In our baseline analysis, we restrit the
sample to inlude only rms with annual sales below 20,000 euros, sine these rms an be thought
of as being aeted by the threshold. Furthermore, we exlude rms that are taxed on an assessment
by the Finnish Tax Administration, as tax reord information based on assessment does not provide
evidene of behavioral hoies of rms in response to the VAT threshold. Aording to the Finnish Tax
Administration, the most ommon reason for assessed taxation is that a rm has not returned its tax
forms in time.
3.2 Charateristis of small rms and their main owners
Table 1 shows the desriptive statistis of small rms (annual sales between 1,50020,000 euros) and
their main owners in Finland. From the rm-level statistis (upper panel) we an unsurprisingly observe
that most of the rms in our sample do not have any employees, and have relatively low taxable prots,
expenses and assets. The relative average value added of these rms is large, indiating that the expense-
to-sales ratio is typially small. This also implies that the eort of the entrepreneur mostly ontributes
to the value added of the rm. In addition, the high value added relative to sales also indiates that the
tax inentives reated by the VAT threshold are relevant for most small rms and their owners, as they
are subjet to onsiderable relative VAT payments if the threshold is exeeded.
The table shows that sole proprietor is learly the most ommon organizational form among small
rms in Finland, as almost 70% of small rms in our sample are sole proprietors. One fth of the rms
in the sample are privately-held orporations, and 9% are partnership rms. Overall, 90% of the rms
in our sample are owned by a single entrepreneur. Furthermore, small rms represent a wide variety
of dierent industries. However, a large share of rms (36%) operate in the servie setor, whih is a
typial industry for single-owned rms and sole proprietors.
The lower panel of Table 1 desribes the owner-level tax reord data. Overall, the average total inome
of the owner (the sum of taxable gross wage and gross apital inome) is relatively low, approximately
16,600 euros. However, there is a lot of heterogeneity with respet to the inome level of the owner.
Over 50% of the owners in our sample have very low personal taxable inome (below 10,000 euros).
Approximately 20% of the owners have personal inome between 10,00020,000 euros, and roughly 30%
of the owners have personal inome above 20,000 euros.
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In order to more speially desribe the role of the rm in generating inome for the entrepreneur,
we dene owners as 'full-time' entrepreneurs if the annual sales of the rm are larger than the total
inome of the owner. Most of the owners fulll our denition of a full-time entrepreneur, as over 50%
of all main owners in our sample have more annual sales in their rm than they have total personal
gross inome. Also, 'full-time' owners are distributed equally aross genders. Therefore, the desriptive
statistis suggest that part-time businesses do not omprise the majority of our sample, and despite the
relatively low level of sales, many small rms are the main soure of inome for their owner. Overall,
potential heterogeneous responses to the VAT threshold ould be important in terms of interpreting the
results. For example, the impliations of behavioral responses ould be dierent if only side businesses
respond to the threshold. In Setion 4.1, we study responses to the VAT threshold separately for dierent
types of rms and owners.
Firm-level statistis (n=713,249)
Sales Expenses
∗
Value added
+
No. empl. Prots Assets Sole propri. Corpor. Partn.
Mean 8,883 2,196 6,691 0.157 1,596 10,309 0.688 0.226 0.085
sd 5,346 10,844 11,632 1.100 9,471 66,840 0.463 0.418 0.279
By industry^ Commere Constrution Hospitality Servies Other
Mean 0.156 0.079 0.109 0.360 0.298
sd 0.363 0.269 0.312 0.480 0.457
Owner-level statistis (n=550,373)
⊗
Age Female Tot.In.(TI)
#
TI <10k TI 10-20k TI < 20-30k TI > 30k
Mean 47 0.456 16,605 0.522 0.188 0.118 0.173
sd 13.6 0.498 958,784 0.500 0.391 0.322 0.378
Full time
¤
Female Male
Full time Part time Full time Part time
Mean 0.519 0.252 0.204 0.267 0.277
sd 0.500 0.434 0.403 0.442 0.448
Notes: The sample inludes rms with sales between 1,50020,000 euros per year.
^Industries are ategorized using Statistis Finland's standard Industrial Classiation (2008). 'Servies' inlude professional,
sienti, tehnial, administrative, support servie, soial work and other servie ativities. Transportation and storage are also
inluded in 'Servies'. 'Hospitality' refer to hotels and restaurants. 'Constrution' inludes onstrution and real estate ativities.
'Commere' inludes wholesale and retail trade, and repair of motor vehiles and motoryles. The ategory 'Other' inludes
agriulture, mining, manufaturing, waste management et. Households ating as employers and extraterritorial organizations are
also inluded in the 'Other' ategory.
∗
Information only from 2002 onwards.
+
Value added is dened as sales minus expenses.
⊗
Owner-level information available only
from 2002 onward.
#
Personal total inome (TI) = taxable gross earned inome + taxable gross apital inome.
¤
Full-time=full-
time entrepreneur if personal total inome (apital inome + earned inome) < sales of the rm.
Table 1: Desriptive statistis, 20002013
4 Results
4.1 Overall responses
Figure 4 shows the sales distribution around the VAT threshold for all rms in our estimation sample
using pooled data from 20002013. The gure plots the observed sales distribution (solid line) and
ounterfatual distribution (dashed line) relative to the threshold in bins of 100¿ in a range of +/-
7,000¿ from the threshold. The threshold is marked with a dashed vertial line. The exluded region
[sL, sH ] in the estimation of the ounterfatual is marked with solid vertial lines.
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The gure denotes the estimate for the exess mass at the threshold with bootstrapped standard
errors, and the estimate for the upper limit of the exluded region, sH , whih is determined by the
iterative proess explained above. The upper limit also denotes the sales response of the marginal
bunhing rm, ∆s. Exess bunhing is measured by relating the number of rms in the observed sales
distribution to the ounterfatual density within the region [sL, 0].
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Figure 4: Bunhing at the VAT threshold, 20002013
Figure 4 shows that the exess bunhing is striking. A visually signiant proportion of small rms
loate themselves just below the VAT threshold. In addition, the estimate for exess bunhing (3.0) is
notable and strongly statistially signiant. These imply that the VAT threshold learly aets the
reported sales of small rms. The sales distribution is otherwise rather smooth, with the exeption of
round-number bunhing, whih an be seen as spikes in the distribution at onvenient round numbers
suh as 5,000 and 10,000 euros. Nevertheless, bunhing is muh more evident below the VAT threshold
than at any of the round numbers, implying apparent behavioral responses to the threshold.
In our baseline analysis, the lower limit of the exluded range is -9, and the ounterfatual density
is estimated using a 7th-order polynomial funtion. Table 3 in the Appendix shows the results when we
vary these hoies. Overall, the onlusion of distintive exess bunhing is robust to dierent hoies.
Varying the order of the polynomial from 4 to 10 provides statistially similar results. Dereasing the
lower limit from -4 to -15 inreases the exess bunhing estimate, but estimates using smaller values than
-9 provide statistially similar results. As an additional robustness hek, we follow Kleven and Waseem
(2013) and estimate the ounterfatual density taking round-number bunhing into aount. However,
this does not aet the exess bunhing estimate in a signiant manner (see Figure 18 in the Appendix).
In addition, we study the heterogeneity of the overall response. Table 2 shows the exess bunhing
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estimates separately for dierent types of owners and rms. The main observation is that we nd
signiant exess mass estimates and observe visually lear bunhing in all subgroups. This indiates
that the overall response is not driven by ertain groups of rms and owners responding very atively
while other groups do not respond at all.
However, we nd some dierenes aross dierent types of owners and rms. First, female owners
(exess mass 4.2) appear to bunh more atively than male owners (3.0). In partiular, females lassied
as 'full-time' owners (personal taxable inome < sales of the rm) bunh very atively (5.1). One potential
explanation for this nding ould be that household seondary earners, who are typially women, respond
more. Unfortunately, our data do not inlude information on household harateristis, and we are
therefore unable to analyze this issue more thoroughly. Nevertheless, we observe lear bunhing both for
men and high-inome entrepreneurs, whih implies that the eets aused by the threshold appear not
be in any way limited to seondary earners.
In addition, sole proprietors (3.7) seem to bunh more atively than partnership rms (2.4) and
orporations (2.1). Overall, the general administrative burden is typially smaller for a sole proprietor
ompared to orporations and partnership rms. For example, only sole proprietors are entitled to
use single-entry bookkeeping. However, VAT regulations and VAT reporting do not dier between
organizational forms, whih implies that rms with dierent organizational forms fae similar inentives
not to exeed the VAT threshold. In addition, rms in the servie industry bunh more atively than
others, but the bunhing is signiant in all industry ategories, and thus the results are not driven by
ertain industries.
Furthermore, we divide rms into quartiles based on their expense-to-sales ratios. This ratio approx-
imates the value added of the rm, and thus desribes the variation in remitted VAT at the threshold
between dierent rms. However, this lassiation does not provide exogenous variation in terms of
tax inentives, as many other fators that ould aet rm responses also play a role in the omposition
of the sales and expenses of a rm. For example, it ould be more straightforward for rms operating
in setors with low expenses (suh as personal servies) to adjust their annual sales, regardless of the
size of the inentive. Also, rms with large expenses are more likely to voluntarily register for VAT,
whih signiantly dereases the inentives to respond to the threshold.
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Table 2 shows that rms with
smaller expense-to-sales ratios bunh more atively than others. Nevertheless, rms with large relative
expenses also respond to the threshold, but to a signiantly lesser extent.
Finally, many of the observed rm and owner-level harateristis are orrelated with eah other.
For example, women have, on average, lower personal total inome (11,400 euros) in our estimation
sample, and over 90% of female-owned rms are sole proprietors. Also, it is likely that rms with smaller
expense-to-sales ratios, suh as rms operating in the servie setor, have more annual transations than
12
For example, in 2009, 34% of rms below the threshold were voluntarily registered for VAT in the rst expense/sales
quartile, whereas the share was 59% in the fourth quartile.
21
other similar-sized rms. This implies that both the ompliane osts of VAT reporting and the implied
tax inentives are larger for these rms. Therefore, we are not in general able to distinguish whih of
these various harateristis or inentives fully explain the greater exess bunhing by various groups. In
the next subhapter, we utilize variation in tax inentives and ompliane osts over time to study the
mehanisms behind the observed response. We further disuss heterogeneous responses to the threshold
in terms of welfare impliations in Setion 4.4.
Owner-level harateristis Women Men
Women Men Full time Part time Full time Part time Full time Part time
Exess bunhing 4.214 3.010 4.378 2.546 5.096 2.559 3.423 2.341
Std. error (0.140) (0.146) (0.133) (0.138) (0.153) (0.136) (0.156) (0.155)
Tot in < 10k Tot in 10-20k Tot in 20-30k Tot in > 30k
Exess bunhing 4.198 2.643 2.221 2.966
Std. error (0.131) (0.156) (0.189) (0.166)
Firm-level harateristis
By organizational form By industry lassiations
Sole propr. Partners. Corpor. Servies Hospitality Commere Constrution Other
Exess bunhing 3.690 2.365 2.121 3.603 3.158 2.424 2.888 2.574
Std. error (0.121) (0.200) (0.229) (0.208) (0.167) (0.127) (0.194) (0.159)
By input/sales ratios
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Exess bunhing 4.703 2.718 1.665 1.001
Std. error (0.239) (0.165) (0.134) (0.107)
Table 2: Exess bunhing estimates for dierent types of owners and rms, 20002013
4.2 Tax inentives and ompliane osts
4.2.1 Tax inentives
To understand the impliations of size-based thresholds, it is important to know why rms respond to
them. In the ase of the VAT threshold, small rms ould respond to it both beause of tax inentives
and ompliane osts. From a poliy perspetive, it is ruial to know whether adjusting tax inentives
or ompliane osts would aet the distortions aused by the threshold. We begin by studying the role
of tax inentives. We utilize the hange from the VAT noth system to the VAT kink system. Intuitively,
if the VAT rate at the threshold matters, we should nd notably less rms bunhing below the VAT kink
ompared to the VAT noth.
Figure 5 shows the sales distributions for all rms around the VAT noth regime in 20002003 and
the VAT kink regime in 20042009. The gure learly shows that exess bunhing at the threshold is
signiant and similar in size both in the VAT noth and the VAT kink regimes. In partiular, there is
no signiant dierene when omparing the extent of the behavioral response in 20002003 and 2004-
2009. The estimate for the dierene of the exess mass estimates between these regimes is small and
insigniantly dierent from zero, -0.269 (0.237).
13
13
This dierene in the estimates is alulated as follows: we rst estimate a large number of exess mass estimates for
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These ndings indiate that despite the drasti drop in remitted VAT above the threshold after 2004,
we nd no signiant hanges in the behavioral response to the VAT threshold. This implies that fators
other than the VAT rate strongly aet the deisions of entrepreneurs.
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Figure 5: Bunhing at the VAT noth (20002003) and VAT kink (20042009)
To oer further evidene of the eets of tax inentives, we utilize an industry-spei VAT rate
redution. In an experiment with redued VAT rates in the servie industry in Finland, the VAT rate for
hairdressers was redued from 22% to 8% in 20072011. However, other similar types of servies, suh
as beauty salons, were not subjet to the redued rate. Therefore, if tax inentives drive the response,
we should observe a deline in exess bunhing for hairdressers in 20072011, in omparison to otherwise
similar servies with no hanges in the VAT rate.
14
Figure 6 shows the sales distributions around the VAT threshold for both hairdressers and beauty
salons in 20042006 and 20072009. From the gure, we an observe that hairdressers bunh very atively
both before and after the reform (upper graphs), but there is a slight derease in the estimated exess
mass after the reform. However, when ompared to beauty salon servies, we observe a similar small
derease in exess bunhing between the two periods (lower graphs). The estimate for the dierene-
in-dierenes in exess bunhing over time between the two industries is not statistially dierent from
zero (0.532 (1.072)).
15
This implies that the two setors do not dier in terms of behavioral responses to
the threshold, even though that the VAT rate for hairdressers was nearly 60% lower in the latter period.
This result provides further evidene that the hange in tax inentives at the threshold does not aet
the bunhing behavior. It is important to note that potential issues related to understanding the hanges
in the overall VAT system within the VAT relief reform do not play a role in Figure 6. In 20042009, the
both the VAT noth and VAT kink periods using the bootstrap proedure explained in Setion 2.5. After eah round, we
alulate the dierene of the exess mass estimates, and then alulate the standard deviation of the average dierene to
examine whether or not the dierene in exess bunhing between the regimes is signiantly dierent from zero.
14
Kosonen (2015) studies the prie and demand eets of this targeted VAT rate redution for hairdressers using beauty
salons as a omparison group. In another redued VAT rate experiment, the VAT rate for restaurant meals was dereased
from 22% to 13% in July 2010. Harju, Kosonen and Nordström-Skans (2015) study rm-level heterogeneity in prie
pass-through using the VAT rate redutions for restaurant meals in Finland and Sweden.
15
This dierene is alulated similarly as desribed in footnote 13 above.
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overall VAT system was not hanged, apart from the experiment with redued rates for spei types of
servies.
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Figure 6: Exess bunhing for hairdressers/barbers and beauty salons, 20042006 and 20072009
Finally, we study the behavior of voluntarily registered rms from 2004 onward. These rms are
eligible for full VAT relief below the threshold, implying that remitted VAT is zero even for voluntarily
registered rms. Therefore, as these rms are (voluntarily) subjet to the ompliane ost of reporting
VAT, they only fae hanges in tax inentives at the threshold.
Figure 7 shows that there is no exess bunhing for these rms. This result for a seleted group of
voluntarily registered rms adds our nal piee of evidene that tax inentives at the threshold have no
signiant eet on the behavior of small rms.
16
4.2.2 Compliane osts
Next we study the eets of the ompliane osts of VAT reporting. In 2010, ompliane osts were
redued in two ways: First, rms no longer needed to le a separate delaration form to apply for VAT
relief. After 2010, just a simple tik in a box in the regular VAT form was required. Seond, small
rms with annual sales below 25,000 euros are required to le their VAT report annually, in ontrast to
monthly reporting before 2010.
16
We slightly modify our estimation strategy when estimating exess bunhing for voluntarily registered rms. As these
rms do not respond to the threshold in a signiant manner, we do not observe any drop in the sales distribution above
the threshold. Therefore, our baseline iteration method, where the upper limit of the exluded region is dened suh that
the exess mass equals the missing mass above the threshold, does not onverge. Thus we simplify the estimation by using
a xed upper limit of 28 (whih is the upper limit in the baseline analysis presented in Figure 4). Varying the hoie of the
xed upper limit does not hange the result in any signiant way.
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Figure 7: Exess bunhing for voluntarily registered rms, 20042013
Figure 8 shows the sales distributions and exess mass estimates before (20042009) and after (2010
2013) the ompliane ost reform. Exess bunhing is learly observable in both periods. However,
there is a visible derease in the exess mass after the reform. The estimate for the dierene in exess
bunhing between these regimes is notable and statistially signiant (-1.351 (0.246)).
17
These results
imply that the redution in osts related to VAT reporting had a notable eet on behavior, in ontrast
to hanges in tax inentives analyzed above.
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Figure 8: Bunhing at the VAT kink before (20042009) and after (20102013) the hange in ompliane
osts
Redution in ompliane osts also redued the osts of voluntary registration. Figure 9 shows
the share of voluntarily registered rms below the threshold in 20042013. We observe a sharp and
distintive jump in voluntary registration from 45% to 55% after 2010. This indiates that the dereased
17
This dierene is alulated similarly as desribed in footnote 13.
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ompliane osts inreased voluntary registration among small rms. Importantly, voluntarily registered
rms were eligible for full VAT relief from 2004 onward, implying that voluntarily registered rms below
the threshold only fae the ompliane osts of VAT reporting.
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Figure 9: Share of voluntarily registered rms below the threshold, 20042013
Cognitive osts related to understanding the VAT rules and regulations ould be an important part of
ompliane osts. One fator that might aet the observed exess bunhing after 2004 and the inrease
in voluntary registration is the transpareny and awareness of the VAT relief sheme. Simplifying and
larifying the proedure applying for the relief in 2010 ould thus also ontribute to the derease in
observed bunhing after the reform.
We do not diretly observe awareness of VAT relief among rms and entrepreneurs, but we do observe
whether a rm has applied for relief from the register data. Thus we an haraterize general knowledge
of VAT relief by studying how many rms above the threshold apply for the relief, and how this behavior
was aeted by the 2010 reform. However, the level of this take-up rate is likely not to give us aurate
information about the atual awareness. Firms might not apply for the relief if the pereived ost of
applying exeeds the monetary benet. This is partiularly relevant for rms with a large expense-to-sales
ratio, as the relative eet of the relief on remitted VAT is smaller for them.
Figure 10 shows the take-up rates of the relief in 2004, 2007, 2011 and 2013. The vertial axis denotes
the share of rms that we observed applying for VAT relief. The dashed vertial lines at 20,000 and
22,500 euros denote the end of the relief region in 2004 and after 2005, respetively.
The gure shows that the take-up rate is around 30% just above the threshold in 2004 and 2007.
This suggests that a notable fration of rms did not apply for the relief. The take-up rate signiantly
inreases to approximately 60% in 2011 and 2013. This oers evidene that the awareness of the threshold
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rules also has an eet. In addition, the gure shows that the share of rms that applied for relief dereases
along with sales, whih is reasonable as the monetary relief also gradually dereases at larger sales levels.
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Figure 10: Share of rms applying for VAT relief in 2004, 2007, 2011 and 2013
Finally, we haraterize the eet of the osts related to the intensity of VAT reporting. In addition
to annual reporting for rms with sales below 25,000 euros, rms with sales between 25,00050,000 are
required to le VAT reports quarterly after 2010, in ontrast to monthly reporting before the reform. If
the osts related to eah VAT report are important, we should nd rms bunhing below these thresholds
of 25,000 and 50,000 euros where the required reporting intensity hanges.
Figure 19 in the Appendix shows that there is no exess mass of rms below these sales thresholds.
The small and sharp spike exatly at 25,000 euros is likely to be a round-number eet, whih is also
detetable at other onvenient round numbers suh as 30,000 and 40,000 euros. However, reporting
frequeny thresholds only desribe reporting osts at the intensive margin, i.e. when the VAT threshold
is already exeeded and the xed ost of VAT reporting materializes. Thus, Figure 19 highlights that
simply hanging the required reporting frequeny for rms that are already reporting VAT is not likely
to aet rm behavior.
4.2.3 Summary
To summarize, our omprehensive analysis utilizing hanges in both the VAT rate and ompliane osts
over time shows that hanges in tax inentives do not aet the behavior of small rms, whereas om-
pliane osts appear to be muh more important. Figure 11 ollets these ndings by presenting exess
mass estimates and the implied tax elastiity estimates for dierent years. The elastiity estimates are
alulated by relating the sales response of the marginal bunher rm to the hange in the remitted VAT,
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as desribed in Setion 2.5. Following the earlier tax responsiveness literature, this elastiity measure
assumes that the hange in the VAT rate at the threshold fully indues the behavioral response.
First, we nd no hanges in exess bunhing at the threshold after 2003. We do not observe even a
gradual derease in exess bunhing over time, whih would be onsistent with entrepreneurs gradually
learning about the hange in tax inentives. In ontrast, we observe a sharp drop in exess bunhing
right after the derease in ompliane osts in 2010.
Seond, we nd a lear jump in the tax rate elastiity estimate right after 2004. This is reasonable
as the extent of the behavioral response did not hange, but the 2004 reform onsiderably dereased the
remitted VAT for the marginal bunher rm. However, it is implausible that the underlying tax rate
responsiveness of entrepreneurs would have experiened suh a sharp and sudden hike. For the elastiity
estimate to remain onstant, we should have observed an exess mass of approximately 0.9 after 2003.
However, the observed exess bunhing estimate does not derease at all, and is above 3 both before and
after 2004. This evidene strongly supports the hypothesis that the response is driven by ompliane
osts, and not by the VAT rate.
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Figure 11: Exess bunhing and the VAT rate elastiity at the threshold, 20002013
Our results highlight the key role of ompliane osts in the behavior of small rms. This indiates
that the reporting and ognitive osts related to the threshold are the main auses of the distortive eets
of this size-based regulation. Intuitively, ompliane osts are largely xed, i.e. they do not inrease
with sales above the threshold. Thus the relative signiane of them is likely to be more relevant for
smaller rms than for larger rms. Therefore, as a poliy onlusion, our results indiate that reduing
and simplifying reporting proedures is likely to derease the welfare osts of size-based rules for small
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rms. We disuss the impliations regarding the optimal level of the VAT threshold in Setion 5.
Finally, we utilize our results to approximate the magnitude of the ompliane ost reated by the VAT
threshold. To do this, we assume that the entire response is aused by ompliane osts, as indiated by
the above results. Therefore, we interpret the response of the marginal bunher to stem from ompliane
osts only. In other words, using the overall response in 20002013, we alulate how muh net value
added the marginal bunher rm is willing to forgo in order to loate just below the threshold.
We nd that the ompliane osts of the threshold are approximately 1,600 euros. This estimate is
larger than the typial survey-based evaluations of ompliane osts for rms, ranging from approximately
600 to 800 euros (see Crawford et al. (2010)). Our approah adds to this literature by estimating the
signiane and magnitude of ompliane osts for entrepreneurs using quasi-experimental variation and
loal non-linear estimation methods.
4.3 Anatomy of the response
Irrespetive of whether rms avoid exeeding the VAT threshold beause of tax inentives or ompliane
osts, it is important to know how rms adjust their behavior. In terms of poliy impliations, it is
relevant to know whether rms respond by dereasing output, or by engaging in ative avoidane or
evasion measures. Responses along all behavioral margins aet tax revenue. However, hanges in
real eonomi ativity, in this ase dereasing the (true) output of the rm, an be onsidered more
detrimental in terms of welfare, whereas hanges through avoidane and evasion might not aet the
real alloation of resoures with a similar magnitude (see e.g. Slemrod (1992), and Slemrod and Gillitzer
(2014)).
To study whether the responses are driven by real responses, avoidane or evasion, we examine how
the prodution fators that rms are required to report to the Tax Administration, suh as the level of
equity, expenses and wages paid to employees, evolve around the VAT threshold. This analysis illustrates
the mehanisms related to the observed patterns of responses, rather than providing rigorous evidene
of avoidane or evasion. Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2016) use a similar approah when studying the
anatomy of the eet of a tax enforement threshold for large rms in Spain.
How do we predit various rm-level variables to evolve around the VAT threshold? If evasion through
underreporting of sales is the main explanation for why rms loate themselves below the threshold, we
should nd that the level of reported expenses, wages and equity levels are larger just below the threshold.
In other words, if sales are systematially underreported, we should observe the bunhing rms to be,
on average, larger than other rms around the threshold. It is important to note that rms both below
and above the threshold have lear inentives to (honestly) report expenses and wages, as they need to
pay taxes on their prots (sales minus expenses and wages). Therefore, in terms of minimizing taxes,
there are no inentives to underreport any arued osts that are tax dedutible. Thus in the absene of
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evasion responses, prodution fators should develop smoothly around the VAT threshold as the rm's
sales inrease.
Another explanation for the bunhing behavior ould be avoidane. One way to avoid rm-level VAT
liability is to set up multiple rms and report the sales of eah entity separately suh that the threshold
is never exeeded. This type of behavior has been previously deteted for relatively large rms (Onji
2009). We test this hypothesis by examining the average number of rms per individual owner around
the threshold. If avoidane behavior explains the bunhing response, we should nd the average number
of rms per owner to be signiantly larger just below the threshold than above it.
If we do not detet evidene of evasion or avoidane, it suggests that rms respond by reduing real
output. However, as in other studies utilizing register-based data and quasi-experimental variation in
inentives, we do not observe intentional misreporting of overall business ativity, suh as operating fully
or partly in the blak market. Therefore, we are not able to provide onlusive evidene of potential
evasion responses.
Figure 12 shows the development of rm-level fators around the VAT threshold using pooled data
for 20022013. In the gure, we plot a loal polynomial funtion with 95% ondene intervals using a
bandwidth of 100 euros to illustrate potential hanges in prodution fators around the threshold.
The upper two graphs show that the levels of rm-level equity and total wages paid to employees
inrease smoothly as the sales of the rm inrease. In other words, there are no jumps in these variables
at the VAT threshold. This implies that rms on both sides of the threshold are equal in size, and this
gives a rst piee of evidene that larger rms do not otherwise loate themselves below the threshold
by underreporting their sales.
The lower-left graph in Figure 12 shows that the level of expenses jumps signiantly just above the
threshold, indiating that, on average, rms just below the VAT threshold inur less expenses to ahieve
a similar level of sales. However, this evidene does not point to ative evasion responses below the
threshold. In ontrast, it rather suggests that rms just below the threshold have higher prot margins
and produtivity. The lower-right graph in Figure 12 also supports this view. On average, rm prots
are higher just below the VAT threshold and derease sharply right above the threshold. This is an
intuitive result, as rms below the threshold do not need to pay VAT, and thus have higher after-tax
prots than similar rms with equal selling pries above the threshold that are subjet to VAT.
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Figure 12: Firm-level prodution fators around the VAT threshold, 20022013
In order to more rigorously examine whether or not there are statistially signiant dierenes
in prodution fators at the threshold, we utilize the regression disontinuity (RD) method. The RD
approah oers us a way to investigate the statistial inferenes of potential dierenes in prodution
fators at the VAT threshold.
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Table 4 in the Appendix shows these results. The level of equity seems to
be statistially insigniantly dierent on both sides of the threshold. For wages, we observe a statistially
signiant inrease at the threshold, but the dierene is very small (56 euros). In ontrast, the level
of expenses is learly smaller for rms below the threshold ompared to rms above it. Consistently,
reported prots are also signiantly higher for rms below the threshold. Therefore, these results are
in line with the previous ndings.
Figure 13 presents the average number of rms per individual owner around the threshold. The
left-hand side of the gure shows that avoidane via multiple rms appears not to explain the observed
behavior, as there is no statistially signiant jump in the number of rms below the threshold. Overall,
the average number of rms per owner is very lose to one at the threshold. This is driven by the fat
that most small rms in Finland are registered as sole proprietors (69% in our sample). For tax purposes,
an entrepreneur annot set up multiple rms registered as a sole proprietor in the Finnish business tax
system.
The right-hand side of Figure 13 presents the number of rms per owner when exluding sole pro-
prietors. This graph indiates that the number of rms per owner just below the VAT threshold is
18
In a more tehnial detail, we follow the method presented in Calonio et al. (2014) by implementing a loal polynomial
RD point estimator with robust ondene intervals. We use a loal linear regression with quadrati bias orretion, a
triangular kernel funtion to onstrut the estimator, and mean squared error optimal bandwidths.
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larger than above it. This implies that at least some owners appear to set up multiple partnership rms
or orporations in order to avoid VAT liability. Nevertheless, this nding does not explain the overall
bunhing result. Table 2 already showed that exess bunhing is evident among all types of rms and
owners. In fat, in omparison to sole proprietors, the average exess bunhing is even somewhat smaller
for partnership rms and orporations.
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Figure 13: The average number of rms per owner around the VAT threshold, 20002013
In summary, the empirial ndings show that ative avoidane and evasion responses do not explain
the observed bunhing behavior. This (indiretly) suggests that rms respond to the threshold with a real
eonomi deision, i.e. by reduing output. Previous literature has shown that avoidane is an important
fator in explaining observed responses to VAT threshold and other size-based rules among larger rms
(see e.g. Onji (2009), Li and Lokwood (2015), and Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2016)). However,
our ndings suggest that small rms are not as able to utilize these behavioral margins ompared to
larger rms, implying that the distortions aused by size-based thresholds ould have more signiant
welfare onsequenes among smaller rms.
4.4 Growth eets
Size-based thresholds tend to reate inentives for rms to stay small. This potentially indues negative
eets on rm growth and implies signiant eieny losses. The panel struture of the data allows us
to follow rms over time, and thus examine the eets of the VAT threshold on rm growth.
We begin by examining the persistene rates in bunhing over time. The persistene rate denotes
the probability that a rm remains in the same bin from one year to another. Figure 14 presents the
persistene rates of rms within dierent bins of 1,000¿ on both sides of the VAT threshold. The gure
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learly shows that the persistene in the bin just below the threshold is notably larger than in other
bins lose to the threshold. For example, almost 25% of rms loated just below the threshold in the
previous year also loated in the same bin in the next year (upper-left panel). The persistene rates in
other bins lose to threshold are learly smaller, approximately 10%. This implies that the threshold
signiantly hinders the growth of small rms, and reates a barrier for rm growth. Furthermore,
the persistene rate just below the threshold seems to be evidently larger than in other bins near to
the threshold after multiple years, even after four years (lower-right panel). This further highlights the
potentially detrimental growth eets of the VAT threshold for small rms.
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Figure 14: Persistene rates in dierent bins around the VAT threshold after one, two, three and four
years, 20002013
In general, potential negative growth eets produe dierent welfare impliations among dierent
types of rms. If low-inome entrepreneurs are loked below the threshold for many onseutive years,
the threshold has diret impliations for the well-being of these individuals. In ontrast, the relative
eets on disposable inome are less pronouned for part-time entrepreneurs who earn signiant inome
outside the rm. Nevertheless, the welfare eets ould also be onsiderable for this group. In general,
it is ineient if highly produtive rms loate themselves below the threshold repeatedly. Furthermore,
it ould be more eient in terms of overall produtivity if the entrepreneur worked full time in a highly
produtive rm instead of being a wage earner. This potential ould be unrealized if the threshold
prevents these rms from growing. Furthermore, it ould be that in the long run these rms would hire
additional workers in the absene of this growth barrier.
Figure 15 presents the average growth rates of sales around the VAT threshold by owner-level inome
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groups. We alulate one-year logarithmi growth rates (t−(t−1)) of sales onditional on loating in 200
euro sales bins in the base year t−1. The upper-left panel of the gure shows that the average growth rate
jumps just above the threshold among entrepreneurs with very low personal inome (earned + apital
inome < 10,000 euros). Among owners with inome between 10,000 and 20,000 euros, the growth rate
also inreases above the threshold (upper-right panel), but not as muh as in the lowest inome group.
In ontrast, the average growth rates seem to be rather stable around the threshold among owners with
higher inome levels above 20,000 euros. This indiates that the VAT threshold appears to signiantly
derease the growth of rms espeially among owners with low inome levels, but the lok-in eet is not
signiantly present for owners who have aess to signiant inome outside the rm. Nevertheless, we
do observe that high-inome owners bunh atively below the threshold (see Table 2), but the threshold
does not appear to indue any longer-term distortions to these entrepreneurs.
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Figure 15: Annual sales growth rates of rms with owners in dierent inome groups, 20022013
In addition, we study the growth eets by omparing Finnish rms to similar rms in Sweden,
where the VAT threshold is not applied. For Sweden we have data on rms operating in labor-intensive
industries in 20052013. Thus, in the following analysis, we restrit the data on Finnish rms to inlude
only the same industries within the same period.
19
Swedish rms represent an intuitive benhmark for analyzing the growth eets of the Finnish thresh-
old. Despite dierent VAT threshold poliies, the VAT systems are otherwise similar in Finland and
19
Data on Swedish rms is used with the permission of the Swedish Tax Administration. Labor-intensive industries
over mainly onstrution, leaning and other personal servies. In more detail, the data inlude Swedish and Finnish
rms from the following two-digit industry odes: 41-43, 47, 50, 71, 74, 81, 84, 85, 88, 93, 95 and 96. More information on
the omposition of industry odes e.g. on Statistis Finland's website: http://www.stat./meta/luokitukset/toimiala/001-
2008/index_en.html.
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Sweden, e.g. in terms of standard VAT rates and redued rates for ertain industries. Also, Finland and
Sweden have very similar business tax systems and share similar overall institutions and ulture. There-
fore, we believe that Swedish rms oer a suitable omparison group for the growth rates of Finnish
rms. To support this argument, Harju, et al. (2015) nd that the overall development of rms in
labor-intensive industries is very similar between Finland and Sweden.
Figure 16 shows the kernel density distributions of Finnish and Swedish small rms (sales between
3,50035,000 euros) in 20052013. As is evident from the gure, Finnish rms seem to bunh learly at
the VAT threshold (vertial solid line in the gure) also in the subsample onsisting of rms operating
in labor-intensive industries. In ontrast, the sales distribution for Swedish rms is smooth, whih is
onsistent with the earlier nding that the VAT threshold indues notable responses among Finnish small
rms. Seond, the relative density of Finnish rms is also larger in the whole region below the threshold,
and somewhat smaller above it. This gives us a rst piee of indiative evidene of the negative growth
eets of the threshold when omparing Finland and Sweden.
0
.
00
00
2
.
00
00
4
.
00
00
6
.
00
00
8
D
en
si
ty
3500 8500 13500 18500 23500 28500 33500
Sales
Kernel − Finland Kernel − Sweden
Note: Bandwidth = 200 euros
Firm sales distributions: Finland and Sweden
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In order to study the growth eets in more detail, Figure 17 shows the average annual growth rates
in dierent parts of the sales distribution (in 200 euro bins) for Finnish and Swedish rms in 20052013.
The following three points are learly visible from the gure. First, below the VAT threshold (vertial
dashed line), the average growth rate of Finnish rms is approximately zero, while omparable Swedish
rms inreased their annual sales by 1015% on average. Seond, above the threshold and below the
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upper limit of the VAT relief region (vertial dotted line), the growth rates are slightly smaller among
Finnish rms ompared to Swedish rms. Third, above the upper limit of the VAT relief region, the
average growth rates are similar between ountries. These desriptive results strongly indiates that the
VAT threshold indues negative eets for the growth of small rms in Finland, in omparison to the
Swedish system with no suh sales-based regulations.
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Figure 17: Average annual growth rates in dierent sales bins for small rms in Finland and Sweden,
20052013
One disadvantage of the bunhing approah is that it mainly delivers evidene of intensive margin
responses, i.e. for rms and entrepreneurs that have deided to start their business. However, the VAT
threshold ould also aet extensive margin deisions related to the entry and exit of small rms, whih
need to be onsidered when analyzing the overall distortions aused by this regulation.
Figure 20 in the Appendix haraterizes the eet of the threshold on entry and exit. The gure
shows the relative exit rates around the threshold and the distributions of entering rms (at the time
the rm/owner is rst observed in the data) for rms in labor-intensive industries in both Finland and
Sweden. The upper-left graph suggests that the VAT threshold has an eet on exit deisions. It appears
that the exit rates are somewhat larger for rms above the threshold than for rms below it. However,
the exit rate drops just below the threshold, whih is onsistent with the above observation of a large
number of rms loating themselves below the threshold in many onseutive years. In omparison, the
exit rates do not feature suh hanges in Sweden.
The upper-right graph of Figure 20 shows that entering rms also tend to loate themselves just
below the threshold. This suggests that the threshold aets the distribution of both new and existing
rms. In omparison, the distribution of entering rms delines smoothly with sales in Sweden.
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To summarize, the VAT threshold aets the dynami deisions of rms and distorts the whole
distribution of rms. Our evidene supports the view that bunhing behavior is very permanent, as
a signiant share of rms avoid exeeding the threshold for many onseutive years. This negative
growth eet is foused on low-inome entrepreneurs rather than part-time owners with signiant inome
outside the rm. This indiates that the threshold has diret eets on the well-being of low-inome
entrepreneurs. Moreover, a omparison between Finnish and Swedish rms that operate in labor-intensive
industries supports the overall onlusion that the VAT threshold has onsiderable eets on growth,
highlighting the detrimental dynami eets of the threshold. In addition, rm exit rates inrease above
the threshold, whih further emphasizes the negative eet on growth.
5 Conlusions
We nd that the VAT threshold for small rms auses signiant behavioral responses in Finland. Our
results oer ompelling evidene that even onsiderable redutions in the VAT rate do not aet the
extent of rms bunhing just below the threshold. However, we observe that a redution in ompliane
osts related to VAT reporting dereased the amount of exess mass at the threshold. This evidene
strongly suggests that ompliane osts drive the response.
Also, we nd no diret evidene of avoidane or evasion nor that splitting larger rms into smaller
entities explains the response, implying that rms derease their real eonomi ativity to avoid VAT
liability. In general, real eonomi responses are more detrimental in terms of welfare than avoidane or
evasion responses, whih have smaller impliations for overall eonomi ativity.
In addition, we nd evidene that bunhing behavior is very permanent, implying that the threshold
hinders the growth of small rms. We nd that the negative growth eets are largest among very
low-inome entrepreneurs, whih has diret impliations for the well-being of these individuals.
A vast existing literature has foused on estimating tax rate elastiities in order to reover suient
statistis on the distortions aused by various taxes (see e.g. Kleven and Waseem (2013) and Devereux et
al. (2014)). These studies typially ignore the potential eets of ompliane osts. Our results highlight
that ompliane osts indue signiant distortions among low-inome entrepreneurs, implying that tax
rate analysis is not suient when analyzing the welfare loss of the tax system. Moreover, we nd that
ignoring ompliane osts an onsiderably overestimate the importane of tax rates. Therefore, if both
tax rates and ompliane osts are aeted by similar (size-based) rules and thresholds, it is ruial to
distinguish between the eets of tax inentives and ompliane osts in order to produe onsistent
poliy onlusions about the eets of dierent types of inentives.
Our results indiate that reduing and simplifying reporting proedures dereases the welfare osts of
size-based rules among small rms. Lowering the osts of VAT registration and reporting would redue
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behavioral responses to the threshold, both within a year and over time. In the Finnish ase, avenues
for reduing ompliane osts inlude, for example, making the VAT relief system fully automati (ex
oio), and by merging the VAT reporting forms with the annual inome tax ling proedure.
In addition, our results relate to the theoretial literature approximating the optimal VAT threshold.
Keen and Mintz (2004) nd that the optimal threshold depends on several fators, suh as administrative
osts, ompliane osts, the VAT tax rate, the ratio of value added to sales, and the marginal ost of publi
funds.
20
Many of these parameters are diretly observable, suh as the VAT rate and administrative osts.
However, ompliane osts and the marginal ost of publi funds need to be estimated.
Based on our empirial results, we approximated the ompliane osts of the VAT threshold for rms
to be 1,600 euros. We use this estimate and the formula by Keen and Minz (2004) to approximate
the optimal VAT threshold in Finland. First, we assume that the marginal ost of publi funds is 1.3.
Then, using a VAT rate of 24% (standard VAT rate in Finland), a ratio of value added to sales of
70% (alulated using our baseline sample), and an administrative ost of 320 euros per rm (following
Crawford et al. (2010) and assuming that 20% of ompliane osts represent the administrative osts of
the tax administration), we approximate the optimal VAT threshold to be 32,000 euros in Finland. This
estimate is learly larger than the urrent VAT threshold of 10,000 euros.
Therefore, in addition to reduing the ompliane osts of rms, the distortive eets of the threshold
ould be redued by inreasing it. This is intuitive, as the xed ompliane ost is likely to be less
signiant for larger rms. However, earlier literature shows that larger rms tend to respond to size-
based thresholds by avoidane and/or evasion (see e.g. Onji (2009)), rather than real eonomi responses.
Thus there is likely a tradeo between redued negative eets of ompliane osts and inreased evasion
and avoidane responses if the urrent threshold is inreased.
20
Keen and Mintz (2004) show that the formula for the optimal VAT threshold is the following: z∗ =
δA+C
(δ−1)τN
, where δ
denotes the marginal ost of publi funds, τ the VAT rate, N the ratio of value added to sales, A administrative osts and
C ompliane osts.
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Figure 18: Bunhing at the VAT threshold: taking into aount round numbers in the estimation of the
ounterfatual density, 20002013
Order of polynomial (baseline=7)
4 6 8 10
Exess bunhing 3.201 3.022 2.840 2.607
Std. error (0.131) (0.163) (0.169) (0.210)
Bunhing region (baseline=(-9 - 0))
-4 - 0 -6 - 0 -12 - 0 -15 - 0
Exess bunhing 2.314 2.759 3.271 3.521
Std. error (0.082) (0.112) (0.226) (0.292)
Table 3: Robustness heks: order of the polynomial and the bunhing region, 20002013
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Figure 19: Annual sales of rms and VAT reporting thresholds: 25,000e (quarterly reporting) and 50,000e
(monthly)
VARIABLES Equity Wages Expenses Prots
Estimate 50.14 56.10*** 1,620*** -447.1***
(72.98) (16.44) (6.145) (63.73)
Observations 98,205 84,592 14,776 63,688
BW Lo. Poly. (h) 1549 1169 183 860.5
BW Bias (b) 2888 1901 456.3 2009
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Dierenes in prodution fators aross the threshold alulated using the regression disonti-
nuity approah (following the approah in Calonio et al. (2014))
43
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
Pe
r c
en
t
−5000 −2500 0 2500 5000
Exit rate − Finland
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
−5000 −2500 0 2500 5000
Distribution of entering firms − Finland
.
07
.
08
.
09
.
1
.
11
.
12
Pe
r c
en
t
−5000 −2500 0 2500 5000
Distance from the Finnish VAT threshold
Exit rate − Sweden
15
0
25
0
35
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
−5000 −2500 0 2500 5000
Distance from the Finnish VAT threshold
Distribution of entering firms − Sweden
Note: Local polynomial with 100 euro bandwidth
 Kernel function  95% CI 
Figure 20: Exit rates and distributions of entering rms, rms in labor-intensive industries in Finland
and Sweden, 20052013
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